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Abstract: The boundaries of social categories are frequently altered to serve normative 
projects, such as social reform. Griffiths and Khalidi argue that the value-driven modification 
of categories diminishes the epistemic value of social categories. I argue that concerns over 
value-modified categories are an endorsement of problematic assumptions of the value-free 
ideal of science. Contrary to those concerns, non-epistemic value considerations can increase 
the epistemic success of a scientific category. For example, the early history of the category 
infantile autism shows how non-epistemic value considerations can contribute to delimiting 
and establishing infantile autism as a distinct category in mainstream psychiatry. In the case 
of infantile autism, non-epistemic considerations have led to a new interpretation of existing 
data, the expansion of research to include biology, and the creation of diagnostic criteria that 
further contribute to collecting relevant data. Given this case study, we see that non-epistemic 
considerations may not be epistemically detrimental but can be epistemically beneficial in 
scientific classification. 
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1. Introduction 
Paul Griffiths (1997, 2003, 2004) defines natural kinds as categories that allow reliable 
extrapolation from known to unknown instances. Such kinds have greater epistemic value as they 
are further confirmed by empirical evidence. He notes that the boundaries of social categories are 
frequently altered to serve normative projects, such as social reform, without “theoretical warrant” 
(Griffiths, 1997, p. 196). This observation becomes a source of trouble for him since it is possible 
for a category to be pressured to respond to two different types of projects—epistemic and 
normative—simultaneously. According to Griffiths, a category under such pressure ends up being 
fractured and loses its epistemic utility (2004, p. 909). 
Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2013) develops Griffiths’ observation into a substantial worry for 
social, psychological, and psychiatric categories being natural kinds. These categories are 
employed to describe and explain human behavior and are value-laden to some extent. The 
problem Khalidi focuses on is that “there is often an added moral dimension to them that puts 
pressure on us to modify the category in certain ways” (ibid., p. 195). For Khalidi, the aim of 
scientific classification is to have categories that reflect “real causal patterns” in the world. The 
more accurately they reflect causal patterns, the more epistemically useful scientific categories 
are. He argues that when non-epistemic values, such as social, moral, and political values, 
influence delimiting scientific categories, these categories may no longer track the causal structure 
of the world. Khalidi’s prescription is that scientists should be guided solely by epistemic purposes 
and eliminate non-epistemic purposes altogether.  
 Griffiths and Khalidi present non-epistemic value considerations as harmful in scientific 
classification. Non-epistemic value influences on scientific categories result in the epistemically 
detrimental consequences of hindering scientific understanding (for Griffiths) and distracting us 
from the causal structures of the world (for Khalidi). It is noteworthy that such a view regarding 
non-epistemic values is part and parcel of the value-free ideal (VFI) in science. The current version 
of the VFI endorses an exclusive commitment to epistemic values while allowing no role for non-
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epistemic values in the core of scientific reasoning, e.g., generating data and assessing theories.1 
The ideal maintains that scientific objectivity and integrity are achieved to the extent that scientific 
reasoning is insulated from non-epistemic value influences. If we see the concern over values 
affecting categories through the lens of the VFI, the normative implication for scientific 
classification becomes clear: scientists should strive to minimize the influence of non-epistemic 
values in identifying natural kinds. This implication is clearly echoed in Khalidi’s suggestion of 
excluding non-epistemic purposes in the pursuit of natural kinds. However, as will be shown in 
this paper, far from being epistemically detrimental, value-driven research in scientific 
classification can be epistemically beneficial. 
 This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I address the concern over value-modified 
categories by analyzing the case study of child abuse presented by several philosophers (Hacking, 
1988, 1991, 1999; Griffiths, 1997, 2004; Khalidi, 2013). Upon reflection, the category child abuse 
is not a good example to motivate this concern. In section 3, I provide another case study, infantile 
autism, to illustrate how non-epistemic value considerations can contribute to the epistemic 
improvement of that category. In section 4, I respond to some potential objections to my account 
with the help of some arguments against the VFI. I conclude that the argument for rejecting non-
epistemic values in identifying natural kinds in the social and psychological sciences is not 
effective. 
 
2. The Concern: Illegitimacy of Non-Epistemic Values in Natural Kinds 
In this section, I pursue two aims. First, I want to elaborate Griffiths’ and Khalidi’s concerns over 
the value-driven modification of categories. They focus on the case study of the category child 
abuse presented by Ian Hacking (1988; 1991; 1999). Second, I want to point out that the category 
of child abuse is not a good example for raising their concerns. This is because the category of 
child abuse does not show the conflict between epistemic and non-epistemic purposes.  
In his 2004 article, Griffiths introduces the notion of “normative kinds,” which are contrasted 
with natural kinds. A category is a “normative kind” when it “derives its unity from a role in 
normative practices…rather than from any role it may have in describing and explaining behavior” 
(p. 903). Griffiths considers the category of child abuse as a prime example of a normative kind. 
We place seemingly unrelated behaviors, such as neglect and sexual harassment, in the category 
child abuse. This practice is justified by our moral approval or disapproval of certain types of 
human behavior. Consider, for example, corporal punishment. Until recently, physical punishment 
for children was common and even encouraged as an effective means to teach children to conform 
to authority and social order. Identifying corporal punishment as a type of child abuse can be 
 
1 Here I follow Daniel Hicks’ formulation of the VFI, according to which, “ethical and political values may 
not legitimately influence the standards for acceptance and rejection in” the “epistemic phase” of scientific 
inquiry (Hicks, 2014, p. 3274). Many formulations articulate the VFI in terms of “absence of contextual 
values” and “exclusive commitment to epistemic values in scientific reasoning” (Reiss & Sprenger, 2017, 
p. 21). 
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explained by the change in our normative attitudes toward children and our preference for 
autonomy and self-fulfillment over social conformity and social stability. 
   In line with Hacking, Griffiths argues that socially or politically value-laden concepts, such as 
the concept of child abuse, “are used to structure social systems, to further the interests of 
individuals or groups, and to promote programs of political action” (1997, p. 7). According to 
Griffiths, studying this type of category modification reveals “the full range of dynamics at work 
in conceptual change” and, in doing so, directs our attention to social issues and pushes us to take 
action to address them (ibid., p. 198). For example, if common wisdom views leaving children at 
home without adult supervision as a form of child abuse, then society should seek solutions for 
those parents who cannot afford childcare. However, Griffiths is clear that such a value-driven 
alteration of a category does not improve our scientific understanding of the relevant phenomena 
(ibid., 200). Non-epistemic projects are seen as forces that sidetrack the discovery of natural kinds. 
Khalidi (2013) builds on Hacking’s (1991) analysis of legal attempts in the USA to classify fetal 
abuse as a form of child abuse. By doing so, he wants to reinforce Griffiths’ idea that the moral 
dimensions of a category can undermine the epistemic roles the category plays: normative kinds 
or “evaluative kinds” can reduce their “epistemic efficacy” when “they are being put (at least 
partly) to evaluative uses (Khalidi, 2013, pp. 162–163). Let me add some more details about legal 
attempts to charge pregnant women with child endangerment when abusing substances. The 
Wisconsin State Legislature passed the so-called “Cocaine Mom” Law in 1997. Under this law, 
pregnant women who drink alcohol or take drugs are indicted on charges of abusing their “unborn 
child” (“1997 Wisconsin Act 292”).  The issue of whether a fetus should be understood as an 
“unborn child” possessing legal rights is highly controversial. As Khalidi speculates, the 
legislature’s move was mainly motivated by the desire for moral censure, especially by pro-life 
advocates. Khalidi regards the fetal abuse case as a clear example demonstrating how “a value-
driven revision of a category pulls in a different direction from the epistemic,” and the value-
driven modification undermines the epistemic, thereby rendering the category not a natural kind 
(Khalidi, 2013, p. 163). According to Khalidi, if fetal abuse cases do not share the same cause and 
effect with other incidents of child abuse, they will add exceptions to the phenomenon of child 
abuse. Having a heterogeneous category prevents scientists from generalizing and explaining the 
phenomenon of child abuse. Different purposes “serve different needs and can therefore come to 
be opposed to one another (ibid., p. 162). He goes on to argue that “there is a legitimate reason for 
thinking that some social categories do not track natural kinds when they are being put (at least 
partly) to evaluative uses” (ibid., p. 162). Thus, Khalidi concludes that value-driven modifications 
of a category are likely to frustrate the epistemic aims of generalization and explanation, thereby 
becoming “the largest obstacle to the discovery of natural kinds in the social sciences” (ibid., p. 
163). 
It is questionable whether evaluative or non-epistemic dimensions of a scientific category pose 
a threat to the good epistemic functioning of that category. One line of research that can test 
Khalidi’s claim is etiological research on intergenerational transmission of child abuse. It has been 
widely studied whether and to what extent the parental history of abuse plays a causal role in the 
perpetration of abuse. Research on the transmission hypothesis has an epistemic aim of revealing 
the causal relation of the transmission of abuse from one generation to the next. At the same time, 
Forthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (2020)                                                           Preprint 
How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification 
 
 
5 
 
it aims to find effective intervention measures to break the cycle of abuse. It would be helpful to 
review a recent study on the intergenerational transmission hypothesis to see whether non-
epistemic aims sidetrack epistemic aims. The research conducted by RaeAnn E. Anderson and her 
colleagues (2018) is motivated to identify a reliable predictor of child abuse potential among 
racially diverse mothers who reside in domestic violence shelters. That research is also dedicated 
to providing practical help for the mothers in shelters since they belong to “a marginalized group 
with unique vulnerabilities” (ibid., p. 88).  
Anderson’s team’s research was successful in achieving the two aims without sacrificing one 
for the other. In terms of epistemic aims, it discovered that the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) caused by domestic violence is strongly associated with the perpetration of child 
maltreatment, and it disproved the common assumption that the history of child abuse is the most 
powerful predictor of future abuse. In terms of non-epistemic aims, the research advocated serving 
the mental health needs of mothers by customized intervention strategies (e.g., home-delivered 
care by experts other than doctors, the offering of services outside of traditional office hours and 
so on.) (ibid., p. 88). In this research, serving the non-epistemic aim of helping mothers in domestic 
violence shelters does not stand in the way of revealing the causal path of child abuse. In other 
words, epistemic and non-epistemic aims need not be opposed to one another.  
Griffiths’ and Khalidi’s concerns derive from observing the co-existence of epistemic and non-
epistemic aims within social categories. In this section, I have examined the category of child 
abuse to see to what extent it can motivate their concern. Based on the purported clash between 
epistemic and non-epistemic purposes, Griffiths and Khalidi frame the latter purposes as a 
hindrance to attaining the former. However, the category of child abuse is not a good case for 
raising their concerns. As Hacking and Griffiths point out, the category of child abuse is heavily 
normative from inception. Further, as seen in the previously cited research, the way child abuse 
figures in epistemic practice is tightly entangled with non-epistemic considerations. However, 
more importantly, non-epistemic considerations need not hinder epistemic aims. Indeed, in the 
next section, we will see that normative, non-epistemic considerations can help promote epistemic 
ends. 
 
3. Infantile Autism  
In this section, I examine the early history of the category of infantile autism. In common with 
other psychiatric categories, the concept of infantile autism is loaded with normative assumptions 
about what counts as normal behaviors, such as our positive evaluation of communicative ability 
and social interaction. When it first appeared in the literature in the 1940s, it was understood as a 
psychosis mainly caused by emotional disturbance, leaving cognition intact (Zeldovich, 2018). 
However, the psychogenic explanation gradually gave way to neurobiological explanations 
through the mid-twentieth century. With progress in genetics and neurobiology, infantile autism2 
 
2 In the early 1990s, the idea that autism is not a single condition, but a spectrum of disorders different in 
degree and types was proposed. In the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-5), Asperger’s disorder, childhood disintegrative disorder, and pervasive developmental 
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has been identified as a neurodevelopmental disorder, and the role of combined genetic and 
environmental risk factors has been extensively studied (Chaste & Leboyer, 2012; Lai et al., 2014). 
In 1980, infantile autism was finally recognized by mainstream psychiatry as a formal 
developmental disorder in the DSM-III. My case study tracks what drove the change in viewing 
infantile autism as a psychosis to a distinct neurodevelopmental disorder. By focusing on the role 
of value commitments, I aim to show the following: i) how research motivated by non-epistemic 
value judgments led to a critical examination of the received view, thereby revealing its empirical 
inadequacy; ii) how value-driven research led to the expansion of the research field; and iii) how 
value commitments contributed to the creation and development of diagnostic criteria, helping to 
demarcate the category. 
3.1. Mothers Blamed for Infantile Autism 
Until the mid-twentieth century, autistic children were not distinguished from children who were 
schizophrenic or mentally ill. It was the child psychiatrist Leo Kanner (1943) who first identified 
infantile autism as a distinct group. He provided detailed studies of eleven children who exhibited 
traits that were different from the traditional description of such children as “feebleminded or 
schizophrenic” (ibid., p. 242). The characteristics of the children Kanner noticed included extreme 
autistic aloneness, an inability to relate in an ordinary way to people and situations, and an 
anxiously obsessive desire for the maintenance of sameness. Kanner was particularly attentive to 
the parental personalities: most of the parents were highly intelligent but rarely appeared warm-
hearted (ibid., p. 250). In a subsequent paper, he analyzed parental characteristics and concluded 
that “parental coldness, obsessiveness, and a mechanical type of attention to material needs only” 
is the main cause of infantile autism (Kanner, 1949, p. 425). The image of cold and unloving 
parents of autistic children has continued since then and has deeply influenced subsequent research. 
The mother-blaming account, succinctly captured in the term “refrigerator mother,” was 
popularized by the child development specialist Bruno Bettelheim (1967). Not surprisingly, when 
professionals diagnosed a child with autism, the whole family, especially the mother, suffered 
from the classification.3  
3.2. Empirical Inadequacy of the Received View 
It was Bernard Rimland’s book Infantile Autism: The Syndrome and Its Implications for a Neural 
Theory of Behavior (1964) that initiated modern autism research by replacing the mainstream 
psychogenic views about autism (Associated Press, 2006; Maugh II, 2006; Casanova & Casanova, 
2019). The book was a product of Rimland’s five years’ research on autism after his first-born son 
was diagnosed with it. Though Rimland was a research psychologist, he was ignorant of autism 
and perplexed by his son’s unusual behaviors. When he learned about autism and its purported 
cause, he was hurt by the “pernicious implications” of the psychogenic hypothesis (Rimland, 1964, 
p. 65). He deplored the added “heavy burden of shame and guilt” placed on the parents of autistic 
 
disorder-not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS) were brought together with autistic disorder to form a single 
category of “autism spectrum disorder.” 
3 Hacking also notes in his study of autism, the purported cause—cold mothering—“damaged” the whole 
family (Hacking, 1999, p. 115). Unfortunately, he does not tell us what propelled the replacement of the 
mother-blaming view with the currently endorsed view. 
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children and criticized the “heartless and inconsiderate” nature of the psychogenic view (ibid., p. 
65). In the book, he declared that “there is no need for the parents of these children to suffer the 
shame, guilt, inconvenience, financial expense and marital discord which so often accompany the 
assumption of psychogenic etiology” (ibid., p. 40). 
 Since the dominant view was based on the psychogenic account, it was common for practitioners 
to inspect parental characteristics. For example, practitioners tended to report in their papers the 
details of conversations with the mother to show how she exemplified the “typical mother” with 
“cold, impersonal, and ritualistic” attitudes towards her child (For example, see Eveloff, 1960, pp. 
77–78). The standard of explanation in pediatric psychiatry was prejudiced against parents, 
especially mothers. To argue against this trend, Rimland carefully reviewed cases in the literature 
to propose alternative explanations. He realized that much of the evidence supporting the 
psychogenic view was compatible with or better fit the biological hypotheses. One common 
observation made by psychogenic theorists was that “[a]utistic children are behaviorally unusual 
from the moment of birth” (Rimland, 1964, p. 51). For Rimland, it was a strong indicator of 
neurobiological causation of autism. Thus, it came as a surprise to him that little attention was 
paid to the innateness of autism, and even Kanner, who first recognized autism as an innate 
condition, did not investigate deeper the biological roots of autism.4 One distinguishing feature of 
autism from schizophrenia was extreme aloneness (Kanner, 1943, p. 242). Kanner highlighted this 
autistic aloneness in terms of the relationship with the mother and interpreted the withdrawal of a 
child from the mother as an act of seeking comfort in solitude (Kanner, 1949, p. 425). Rimland 
challenged this explanation by citing animal experiments where if offspring are raised by 
indifferent mothers, then the offspring exhibit continued efforts to draw the mother’s attention, 
rather than turning away from the mother (Rimland, 1964, pp. 44–45). Thus, Rimland expanded 
what counted as a legitimate explanation in mainstream psychiatry by exposing the weaknesses 
of the psychogenic view and, at the same time, by showing the superiority of biological 
explanations in many of the cases. 
3.3. The Expansion of the Research Area 
Rimland focused on suggesting alternative explanations to the psychogenic explanation. He 
wanted to expand the research field to include neurobiology that rarely figured in the literature. 
For Rimland, the most serious problem of the psychogenic account was that it discouraged 
researchers from searching for the biological basis of autism. If autism could be thoroughly 
explained by psychogenic factors, then any attempt to find neurobiological causes would be futile:  
So long as the practitioners who actually deal with autistic children feel satisfied 
that the disease is largely or entirely psychogenic, biologically trained research 
 
4 Kanner briefly suggested the biological roots of autism at the end of his seminal paper: “these children 
have come into the world with innate inability to form the usual, biologically provided affective contact 
with people” (Kanner, 1943, p. 250). He also occasionally acknowledged the biological underpinnings of 
autism (e.g., Eisenberg and Kanner 1956). Despite his initial insight, however, Kanner persistently 
emphasized parental coldness as a primary cause of autism in his ensuing research and magazine interviews 
(e.g., Kanner 1960).  
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workers will feel disinclined to concentrate their efforts on the problem. (ibid., p. 
40) 
Having the belief that “no avenue for learning all that we can about the etiology of mental disorder 
should be unexplored,” Rimland proposed multiple lines of research that seemed to be fruitful 
(ibid., p. 61). 
One thing Rimland noticed was the relationship between mental disorder and complications of 
pregnancy. Atypical behaviors of autistic children might be “the consequences of prenatal stress 
rather than of affectional insufficiency” (ibid. p. 145). In his support of this line of research, 
Rimland emphasized how biological hypotheses can shift “the burden of guilt from purely 
speculative parental influences to proven prenatal factors” (ibid., p. 145; emphasis in original). 
Rimland also noted other features that called for biological explanations; for example, the higher 
frequency of diagnosis of autism in boys than girls. 
Another fruitful line of research for Rimland was “the brain mechanisms for processing 
information” (ibid., p. 144). To put his idea in action, he established the Institute for Child 
Behavior Research (now known as the Autism Research Institute, ARI) in 1967. The institute 
began to fund biologically driven “research in immune, gastrointestinal, metabolic, neurological, 
and sensory issues” and research aiming to find treatments for autism. It is clear that Rimland’s 
analysis of the received view expanded the field of study to cover the neurobiological research 
that was urgently needed at that time (Crowell et al., 2019). Rimland is regarded as a pathfinder 
who “reoriented research from a focus on the parents to a focus on the brain” (Carey, 2006, p. 
A21). 
At this point, we need to be reminded of what propelled Rimland to advocate the expansion of 
the research filed to include neurobiological research. As a parent of an autistic son, he was 
fighting against the prejudiced view about parents with autistic children. Not only was the 
psychogenic view inadequate in its evidential standing, but it also had pernicious implications for 
the emotional well-being of the parents. In his objections to the psychogenic account, he asserted 
that “there is no need for the parents of these children to suffer the shame, guilt, inconvenience, 
financial expense and marital discord which so often accompany the assumption of psychogenic 
etiology” (Rimland, 1964, p. 40). His non-epistemic value judgments, such as that the well-being 
of parents with autistic children is important, caused him to expand the research area.  
3.4. Creation of Diagnostic Checklist for Parents 
Another achievement of Rimland is the creation of a diagnostic checklist for parents. As a parent 
of an autistic child, he was aware of the difficulties faced by families with children suspected of 
being autistic. Part of the difficulty was the lack of expertise—only a handful of professionals 
were competent in diagnosing infantile autism in the 1960s (Shattock, 2006). Another difficulty 
parents faced in the 1950s and 1960s was antagonistic attitudes and pointed questions, such as 
“Why do you hate your child?” from their visits to professionals and their casual interactions with 
acquaintances (Grove, 1984; Baker, 2010; Silberman, 2015).  
To assist the perplexed and distressed parents, Rimland developed a rough checklist, the 
“Diagnostic Checklist for Behavior-Disturbed Children (Form E-1),” building on existing criteria 
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available to professionals. It was a systematic diagnostic assessment tool, but the primary target 
was the parents. Designed to be completed by parents, E-1 questionnaires comprised of “a 
carefully selected range of symptoms rather than more abstract and inconsistently defined 
concepts, especially of emotional withdrawal” (Lord & Corsello, 2005, p. 744).5  
What is important in our discussion is that Rimland’s motivation for developing a checklist for 
infantile autism was not entirely epistemic. Rimland’s diagnostic form is well-known to be “most 
useful to parents who are beginning to familiarize themselves with behaviors associated with 
autism, rather than as a measure of standard diagnoses of autism or related disorders” (Lord & 
Corsello, 2005, p. 744). Of course, the checklist had several epistemic aims including collecting 
statistical data (Rimland, 1964, 1993) or distinguishing infantile autism from other childhood 
disorder and types of mental retardation (Rimland, 1964, 1971; Douglas & Sanders, 1968; Boullin, 
Coleman, O’Brien, & Rimland, 1971; Lord & Corsello, 2005). However, as Rimland remarked 
here and there, the primary aim of the checklist was to assist the perplexed parents. As mentioned 
earlier, families with autistic children greatly suffered from prejudice on top of financial burdens. 
To share their emotional struggles, Rimland always answered phone calls from parents, whether 
day or night, listening to them with all his heart. To reduce their financial burdens, Rimland made 
the checklist available to parents free of charge, including scoring, analysis, and delivery of results 
back to the parents6 (Rimland, 1984; Lord & Corsello, 2005).  
Rimland’s value judgments (e.g., the parents with autistic children should not suffer from the 
prejudiced view against them) drew the cooperation of the parents. When the checklist was 
published as an appendix to Rimland’s book, many parents with autistic children completed the 
list and mailed it back to Rimland for his records. It is said that some parents reported symptoms 
of their autistic children that were not recognized by practitioners at that time (Edelson, 2014). 
With the help of sympathetic parents, the list quickly improved to become the “Diagnostic Check 
List (Experimental Form 2)” within a year of the first printing of the book. The updated 
questionnaire included “questions gleaned from the reading of numerous letters and reports from 
parents” (Rimland, 1971, p. 163). The ARI created a large database based on the form and 
analyzed results from more than 40,000 cases. As a result, it can now differentiate more than ten 
types of infantile autism.  
Given the common belief that scientific research ought to be free from personal, social, political, 
and cultural values, it is noteworthy that in this case, the incorporation of a researcher’s values 
produced epistemically fruitful outcomes. Those values helped delimit the boundaries of the 
category by expanding its extension to neurobiological explanations.7 As mentioned earlier, it was 
 
5 Given the prevalent tendency of professionals at that time to disregarded the reliability of retrospective 
parental reports, the checklist represented a significant move that took seriously the engagement of parents 
in the diagnosis of autism (Rimland, 1971). 
6 Looking back at the last thirty years since the publication of his book, Rimland judged the increased role 
of parents in autism research as a crucial contribution of his book. He writes: “parents are taking a much 
stronger and more active role in determining what is done to help their children…These changes are taking 
place on both the educational and biological fronts” (Rimland, 1994, p. 3). 
7 The “defect-based” idea that autism is a disease (disorder) to be treated is now outdated, especially in 
considering the current neurodiversity movement (Jaarsma & Welin, 2012). According to the 
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in 1980 when the DSM-III was published that infantile autism was accorded the status of a separate 
category. However, exactly how did Rimland’s creation of the diagnostic checklist contribute to 
the demarcation of the category of infantile autism?8  
In his pioneering paper, Kanner (1943) recognizes the distinctive characteristics of the eleven 
children and named the shared condition infantile autism. However, he did not aggressively pursue 
the idea that infantile autism is separable from childhood schizophrenia. For example, in his 
second paper on infantile autism, Kanner regarded infantile autism “as the earliest possible 
manifestation of childhood schizophrenia” (Kanner, 1949, p. 419). He didn’t believe that “there 
is any likelihood that early infantile autism will at any future time have to be separated from the 
schizophrenias” (ibid., pp. 419–420). Therefore, coining the term infantile autism can be credited 
to Kanner, but it is controversial whether he deserves the credit for demarcating infantile autism 
from mental retardation or childhood schizophrenia. When Rimland created the checklist, it 
included questions related to childhood schizophrenia, mental retardation, emotional disturbance, 
et cetera. The inclusion of the traits that are non-autistic was meant to differentiate genuine cases 
of autism from other types of psychoses. The scoring of the checklist was based on “the difference 
between his autism (+) and nonautism (-) scores.” (Rimland, 1971, p. 164). Moreover, when 
infantile autism was listed in the DSM-III, its definition adopted a working definition proposed 
by Rimland and other parents of autistic children (Badesch, 2011, p. 9).9 So, Rimland provided a 
clearer division between infantile autism and childhood schizophrenia as well as how to 
distinguish the two. 
3.5. Other Case Studies: Divorce and Intimate Partner Violence 
At this point, let me compare my case study with two other noteworthy ones, divorce and intimate 
partner violence, presented by Elizabeth Anderson (2004) and Janet Kourany (2010), respectively. 
According to Anderson, feminist research on divorce conducted by Abigail Steward et al. (1997) 
demonstrates how a feminist value-driven inquiry can produce “epistemically fruitful” outcomes 
by uncovering evidence that is neglected by purportedly value-free inquiry. Traditional research 
frames divorce as a failure of marriage and loss of opportunity to live a happy life. Accordingly, 
such research only looked for the negative outcomes of divorce, such as the economic hardship 
women experience after their divorce. In contrast, Stewart’s team was open to the possibility that 
divorce can provide “an opportunity for personal growth” (E. Anderson, 2004, p. 14). Due to this 
value commitment, the researchers were able to find evidence that divorced women can develop 
a sense of autonomy by achieving financial independence from their husbands (Stewart et al., 
 
neurodiversity paradigm, the biological fact that there are variations in neurocognitive functioning within 
the human species leads to the normative conclusion that each form of variation should be valued and 
respected. In other words, it has been noted that the perceived “impairments” or “disabilities” of autistic 
people is due to our society’s inability to accommodate the various needs of neurodiverse people. 
8 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for pushing me to clarify this point. 
9 Rimland and other parents established the National Society for Autistic Children (NSAC) in 1965, a 
grassroots organization advocating the rights of autistic children and their families. The Board of Directors 
and the Professional Advisory Board of the NSAC came up with a working definition of infantile autism 
in the late 1970s, and it made clear that “No known factors in the psychological environment of a child 
have been shown to cause autism” (Ritvo & Freeman, 1977, p. 146). 
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1997, p. 102). These positive outcomes added a new understanding of divorce that was not 
possible by traditional research. In sum, appealing to Stewart’s team’s research on divorce, 
Anderson argues that non-epistemic value considerations can play “knowledge-enhancing roles” 
in scientific inquiry without harming the impartiality of science and the fair treatment of evidence 
(E. Anderson, 2004, p. 3).  
Kourany (2010) suggests another example where non-epistemic values can positively contribute 
to the epistemic success of a research program. She highlights research by Carolyn West (2002a, 
2002b) on intimate partner violence. In intimate partner violence research, challenges are faced 
when dealing with similarities and differences across racial groups when it comes to inflicting 
violence on intimate partners. This is particularly noticeable when researchers want to reveal racial 
similarities across racial groups “without negating the experiences of Black women” subject to 
such violence, while, at the same time, emphasizing differences “without perpetuating the 
stereotype that Black Americans are inherently more violent than other ethnic groups” (West, 
2002a, p. 216). Kourany focuses on how West was able to acquire relevant information from the 
African American women who were reluctant to cooperate due to the fear of reinforcing racial 
stereotypes. It was the explicit commitment to feminist egalitarian values, such as the assumption 
that the experiences of Black women matter and that they deserve to live free from domestic 
violence, which was crucial in drawing cooperation from the community (Kourany, 2010, pp. 68–
75). 
West’s research on domestic violence has a direct implication for our discussion of 
categorization in the social sciences.10 Committed to feminist egalitarian values, West emphasizes 
the need to “broaden the definition of partner violence to include psychological, emotional, and 
verbal abuse” (West, 2002a, p. 219). Earlier research on domestic violence only focused on 
physical violence and measured its severity and frequency. Not surprisingly, the phenomenon of 
“escalation of violence” from verbal and psychological to physical abuse was not fully appreciated 
(ibid., p. 220). The fact that many African American women who are victims of physical assault 
had prior psychological abuse, often more frequent and severe than women of other ethnic groups, 
would not have been revealed if researchers like West were not motivated to investigate it. Value-
committed research of domestic violence called for expansion of its definition, and that change in 
definition influenced the entire process of research on domestic violence (Brigandt, 2015, p. 334). 
Here again, we have an example where value-laden research produces epistemically beneficial 
outcomes. 
 
4. Objections: The Value-Free Ideal? 
In the preceding section, I provided case studies from the literature against the VFI to suggest that 
the current discussion of values and classification can benefit from the existing values and science 
literature. My case study of infantile autism directly shows how value-driven inquiry led to the 
 
10 The case of domestic violence provides a good example of how researchers should make value-laden 
decisions before undertaking empirical research. Researchers should “specify the boundaries of entities,” 
such as who is considered an intimate partner and what types of harm are considered to be violence, whose 
experiences should count (only Caucasian women?), and so forth (Ludwig, 2016, p. 1268).  
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epistemic improvement of the category. The current understanding of infantile autism as a 
neurodevelopmental disorder can be attributed to Rimland’s dedication to autistic children and 
their families. According to Griffiths and Khalidi, allowing non-epistemic purposes to shape 
scientific categories can be worrisome because these purposes tend to diminish the epistemic value 
of those categories. Contrary to that concern, the case study of infantile autism shows that serving 
non-epistemic purposes can have epistemically beneficial outcomes in establishing and delimiting 
a scientific category. In the following, I will address some potential objections to my account. In 
doing so, I will make it clear that Griffiths and Khalidi’s concern is an endorsement of problematic 
assumptions of the value-free ideal of science.  
4.1. The Context Distinction Objection 
The first objection proceeds from the perception that every researcher, to some extent, brings their 
values, biases, and beliefs to bear on deciding what research to pursue. Values can legitimately 
influence the choice of research questions, but they do not and should not influence how theories 
are evaluated. It might be objected that the autism case only illustrates how a researcher used his 
value judgments in choosing a research topic and conceiving hypotheses, which is irrelevant to 
the stage of inquiry where evaluating hypotheses happens. In other words, the case study of autism 
does not show how value considerations directly affected the assessment of two competing 
hypotheses—the psychogenic hypothesis and the biological hypothesis. The scientific community 
accepted the biological hypothesis over the psychogenic one, and this choice involved purely 
epistemic considerations, such as which one is more empirically adequate.  
This objection is based on the so-called “context distinction,” which separates the process of 
conceiving and developing a hypothesis (i.e., the context of discovery) from the process of 
justifying and evaluating the hypothesis (i.e., the context of justification). It is often argued that 
non-epistemic value influence in the context of discovery is innocuous, while in the context of 
justification such an influence can corrupt parts of science. This objection, however, suggests a 
more fine-grained distinction between contexts of discovery and justification than Khalidi 
assumes. What he takes to be problematic are non-epistemic purposes that divert the purpose of 
discovering natural kinds. He suggests that “[t]he surest way to ensure that our categories identify 
real kinds is to pursue a scientific method that serves epistemic purposes” (Khalidi, 2013, p. xiv). 
He also claims that “in order to identify [natural kinds] we must be guided by epistemic purposes 
and not be deflected by non-epistemic interests” (ibid., p. 213). For Khalidi, following epistemic 
purposes is also essential in demarcating natural kinds from folk categories: “[F]olk categories 
can be expected to correspond to natural kinds only when they serve an epistemic purpose” (ibid., 
p. 64). Here, Khalidi does not seem to care about the context distinction. His account suggests that 
scientific inquiry ought to be guided by epistemic purposes alone from the outset. Khalidi does 
not consider whether the context of discovery provides values that are then weeded out in the 
context of justification. 
Even if we grant that the distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification matters, 
it is important to note that it has been substantially challenged during the last few decades. Many 
philosophers of science have challenged the distinction by showing that the purported epistemic 
independence of the context of justification from the context of discovery cannot be maintained 
in practice (Okruhlik, 1994; Brigandt, 2015; Bueter, 2015; Elliott & Mckaughan, 2016). 
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According to Katheleen Okruhlik (1994), non-epistemic factors influencing decisions in the 
context of discovery have a significant impact on theory appraisal and the content of science by 
limiting the pool of available theories. For example, if a sexist bias is pervasive in the current 
scientific community, then it tends to restrict scientists’ mindset in such a way that alternative (not 
sexist) theories are inconceivable or prohibited. Consequently, even if the best theory is selected 
on purely objective grounds (in the context of justification), the selected theory can still contain 
sexist assumptions. Okruhlik’s argument is not just about implicit bias. The general lesson we can 
draw from her argument is that once values enter the context of discovery, methodological rigor 
in the context of justification does not guarantee the elimination of values in science.  
Recall that Rimland’s non-epistemic value judgments in the context of discovery resulted in 
positive epistemic benefits in the context of justification. His value judgment that familial well-
being matters motivated him to investigate the disorder and enabled him to find shortcomings with 
the psychogenic view. More importantly, his value judgments functioned as a check on the 
background assumptions that supplement the gap between data and hypothesis (Longino, 1990, 
2002). In the psychogenic view, the data that autistic children sought excessive aloneness was 
interpreted as withdrawal from their uncaring mothers. Rimland’s value of familial well-being 
enabled him to question that background assumption of the psychogenic view and explore other 
background assumptions. Rimland interpreted existing data differently and evaluated the received 
view with available experimental data. Data interpretation and theory evaluation occur at the core 
of scientific reasoning—the “epistemic phase” (Hicks, 2014). The case of infantile autism shows 
that non-epistemic value judgments can positively affect the epistemic phase of scientific 
inquiry—the so-called the context of justification.  
4.2. The Problem of Wishful Thinking Objection 
Another concern one might have is that the autism case would fail to dissuade scientists from 
following Khalidi’s prescription. In particular, it might be argued that Khalidi’s prescription is an 
effective tactic to pursue, given that scientific objectivity and integrity may be threatened by 
commercialization of science. Profit-driven research has been forming an ever-greater part of the 
scientific research, and the worry that this type of research only serves the interests of the sponsors 
has been growing. In biomedical research, for example, it has been noted that pharmaceutical 
company sponsored research tends to reach positive conclusions about new drugs (Friedberg et 
al., 1999). Although this “preference bias” is not the same as outright fabrication of research 
outcomes, it seriously degrades scientific objectivity, and thus it is epistemically harmful (Wilholt, 
2009, p. 92).11 It has also been reported that researchers with financial ties measure only favorable 
factors and intentionally avoid measuring some risk factors that can undermine the safety of the 
tested drugs (Resnik, 2007). In addition, the very fact that the research proving the safety of a new 
drug is funded by the pharmaceutical company that developed the drug can severely damage 
public trust.12 These are a few examples of external influences corrupting scientific research. 
 
11 David Resnik (2000) identifies a number of types of research bias caused by financial interests. Profit-
driven considerations can affect research at all stages of research, from the selection of a research topic to 
dissemination of research outcomes. 
12 Some scholars have expressed such a concern when investigating the association between researchers’ 
positive evaluation of the safety of new drugs and their financial ties with pharmaceutical companies. 
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Accordingly, perhaps it is better to mandate that scientists should stick to epistemic purposes and 
reject all non-epistemic considerations.   
This objection is a familiar argument promoted by proponents of the VFI. The worry that 
allowing non-epistemic values to influence scientific inquiry makes researchers reach preferred 
conclusions has been named as the “problem of wishful thinking” (Brown, 2013, p. 835). This 
problem is directly relevant to the pharmaceutical cases, and it seems to provide a reason to support 
Khalidi’s position that we should exclude non-epistemically value-laden influences all together. 
For example, some might criticize Rimland’s research by arguing that he attempted to revise the 
notion of autism in such a way as to conform to or accord with his value judgments, which is an 
instance of the problem of wishful thinking. If the VFI is appealed to, then both the psychogenic 
hypothesis and the biological hypothesis, are examples of corrupted science. Work on both 
hypotheses violates the norm that scientists should “minimize the influence of contextual [non-
epistemic] values on scientific reasoning, e.g., in gathering evidence and assessing/accepting 
scientific theories” (Reiss & Sprenger, 2017, p. 21). 
Anderson suggests that what advocates of the VFI are worried about is the “dogmatic character 
of value judgments,” meaning that people who hold their values in research will be blind to 
disconfirming evidence and drive their research to preferred conclusions (E. Anderson, 2004, p. 
3). Anderson not only argues that value judgments need not be held dogmatically, but also shows 
that research conducted by “nonfanatical valuer(s)” can better satisfy epistemic standards of 
scientific inquiry, such as fruitfulness, broad scope, and explanatory power, than other purportedly 
neutral research (ibid., p. 9). Returning to Anderson’s example discussed earlier, what the Stewart 
research team did serves as a model for non-neutral but epistemically sound research. Stewart’s 
team found cases where children exhibited high anxiety during regular visits from their non-
custodial fathers after divorce. These cases were disturbing to the researchers since they were 
directly in conflict with the aim of revealing positive aspects of divorce. Rather than narrow-
mindedly holding their beliefs at the expense of the truth, the researchers decided to “continue 
analyzing displeasing findings in the hope of explaining them away” (ibid., p. 17). Further analysis 
revealed that the intense anxiety of children during the scheduled visit of their fathers was due to 
the anticipation of the parents’ fight upon meeting, which was a typical routine prior to divorce. 
Based on this analysis, the Stewart team was able to make practical recommendations for the 
parents who divorced after much conflict, e.g., to arrange spontaneous visits (ibid., p. 17). The 
point of the Stewart team’s research here is to demonstrate that value-committed researchers can 
live up to the standards of scientific inquiry, such as that any inquiry should be open to the 
“possibility of discovering otherwise” regardless of the inquirer’s value commitments (ibid., p. 
20). So, the objection that all research influenced by non-epistemic values will lead to wishful 
thinking is unfounded.  
 
 
 
Their worry is exemplified in the following: “We wonder how the public would interpret the debate over 
calcium-channel antagonists if it knew that most of the authors participating in the debate had 
undisclosed financial ties with pharmaceutical manufacturers” (Stelfox et al., 1998, p. 105). 
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4.3. Ethically Neutral Classification Objection 
Those who sympathize with Khalidi can still argue that epistemically fruitful outcomes of the case 
studies provided in this paper do not establish the analogous result for conceptual issues.13 In other 
words, conceptual issues—how to delimit boundaries of concepts—can be unaffected by 
arguments for the indispensable roles of non-epistemic values in science in general. For example, 
when it comes to judging what counts as genuine instances of child abuse, researchers can and 
should make classificatory choices without taking a subjective stance on normative issues.  
This objection is well captured in Ernest Nagel’s (1961) work on the possibility of social science 
being “ethically neutral.” Arguing against the idea that “an ethically neutral social science is 
inherently impossible” (ibid., p. 495), Nagel offers a way to do so regardless of the heavily norm-
laden nature of social concepts.14 Whenever social scientists “assess” or “estimate” whether “a 
given characteristic is in some degree present (or absent) in a given instance,” they can do their 
job by operationalizing social concepts (ibid., p. 492). John Dupré (2007) provides an example of 
how a Nagelian strategy “converts an evaluative term to a descriptive one” (p. 30). Let us assume 
that a social researcher investigates violent behavior in children. How can the researcher describe 
the degree of violence of a child? Instead of saying that “Sam is a violent little boy,” the researcher 
can report, “Sam scored 84 on the Smith-Jones physical assertiveness scale” (Dupré, 2007, p. 29). 
The former statement delivers a sense of the reporter’s disapproval of violence, whereas the latter 
statement only estimates a given case according to a given standard. By refraining from using 
value-laden terms, e.g., “violent,” the operationalized statement specifies the object of 
measurement, i.e., “physical assertiveness.” 
The first problem with this strategy is its impracticality and inefficiency. To come up with an 
operationalization, a researcher has to consider a variety of theoretical accounts on violence. There 
can be multiple accounts of violence, not just those about physical assertiveness. Converting all 
possible accounts into descriptive statements is neither feasible nor efficient given limited 
resources. The second problem is that operationalization does not get rid of value judgments. 
Instead, it “eliminates values at one stage, but it only pushes them to another, less appropriate 
stage” (Alexandrova, 2018, p. 430) or it makes them less visible (Intemann, 2015, p. 224). In short, 
the conversion from evaluation to description still requires value-laden choices. Eventually, which 
conceptual scheme a researcher adopts turns on what actions are considered undesirable or 
harmful, and which scheme is considered manageable. Moreover, how to delimit the boundaries 
of concepts not only requires having adequate empirical data but also careful considerations of 
why we need that data and how to promote the aim of inquiry (Intemann, 2015, p. 224).15 The third 
problem is that the conversion from evaluation to description is achieved at the expense of losing 
“reasons for action” (Dupré, 2007, p. 30). Not only do we want to have an accurate description of 
violence, but we also want to do something to reduce violence. The normative consideration is not 
 
13 I thank anonymous referees for raising this worry and making suggestions. 
14 Anna Alexandrova (2018) explores three possible strategies a “Nagelian” can pursue. What I consider in 
this paper corresponds to her second formulation of a Nagelian strategy. 
15 Kristen Intemann (2015) provides another relevant example, the case of “biodiversity” in climate change 
research. Measuring impacts of climate change on biodiversity invites numerous decisions that are value-
laden, such as what constitutes a significant loss to be measured.    
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something attached to a descriptive account of violence at a later time. The normative 
consideration is “fundamental to negotiations about what should and should not count as” violence 
(ibid., p. 37).16 In the end, the elimination of “hybrid concepts” (Dupré, 2007) or “mixed claims” 
(Alexandrova, 2018) by converting them into purely descriptive statements is both unattainable 
and undesirable. 
 
5. Conclusion 
As we have seen, some scholars are skeptical about whether social, psychological, and psychiatric 
kinds can be natural kinds, because the boundaries of such kinds are partly shaped by non-
epistemic considerations. Using Griffiths’ terminology, both natural kinds and normative kinds go 
through conceptual changes but with different purposes. Normative kinds serve the aim of social 
reform, while natural kinds serve epistemic aims, such as inductive inference, explanation, et 
cetera. The worry arises when scientific categories are pressured to pursue two heterogenous aims, 
epistemic and normative, simultaneously. The worry is that when a category is revised due to the 
influence of non-epistemic values, the epistemic value of those categories will be diminished and 
the discovery of natural kinds will be derailed. Thus, the best strategy to uncover natural kinds, 
according to Khalidi, is to pursue epistemic purposes and, at the same time, exclude non-epistemic 
purposes. 
 In this paper, I have responded to this worry by providing the case study of infantile autism. The 
early evolution of the concept of infantile autism exhibits changes from understanding infantile 
autism as a form of psychosis, caused by cold parenting, to a neurodevelopmental disorder 
substantially involving biological factors. Establishment of the notion of infantile autism as a 
scientific category involved non-epistemic value judgments, e.g., that the well-being of a family 
with autistic children is important. The positive contributions value-driven research made in 
establishing and delimiting the scientific category of infantile autism included: i) how research 
motivated by non-epistemic value judgments led to a critical examination of the received view, 
thereby revealing its empirical inadequacy; ii) how value-driven research led to the expansion of 
the research field; and iii) how value commitments contributed to the creation and development 
of diagnostic criteria, helping to demarcate the category. Rather than diminishing the epistemic 
value of the category, non-epistemic value commitments led to the epistemic improvement of the 
category. 
By considering potential objections, I have also tried to show that the concern over value-driven 
modifications of natural kinds is motivated by the VFI. Given the various arguments against the 
VFI, we have reasons to doubt the claim that value influence per se is harmful in scientific 
classification. More importantly, as shown in the case study of infantile autism, non-epistemic 
value judgments can be epistemically beneficial in scientific classification.  
 
 
 
16 Here, I replace “rape” from the original paper with “violence.”  
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